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FROM STOREFRONT TO DASHBOARD: THE USE OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO
GOVERN WEBSITES
Kelby Carlson
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately one-fifth of the United
States population has at least one disability.1 The year 2018 marks the twentyeighth year since Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2
and since then, society has been reshaped dramatically by the Internet, which
officially came into existence shortly before the ADA.3 Within several years of
the enactment of the ADA, the Internet became the subject of litigation by people
with disabilities.
Title III of the ADA governs “places of public accommodation,” which the
ADA enumerates at some length,4 and applies to privately owned entities.
Although it contains no direct or unambiguous language concerning the
Internet,5 it was not long before the notion of “place” came up for review in the
courts. The earliest discussion of this issue was in Carparts Distribution Center,
Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc.6 In that case, the
First Circuit held that an insurance carrier who provided its services via the
Internet was a place of public accommodation, even though its service was not
directly provided at a physical location.7 In doing so, the court took a broad
interpretation of the ADA’s definition of a public accommodation, construing it
to apply not only to physical structures but also to provisionary services to which
the public had equal access.8
Other courts interpreted the ADA in a stricter fashion. In 1997, the Sixth
Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s case in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance


J.D. 2018, cum laude, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The
author’s primary academic legal interest is the changing legal landscape surrounding the internet.
The author is currently pursuing a law license in Pennsylvania and hopes to obtain work in the
criminal prosecution or employment law fields. He offers his sincere thanks to Sean Flaim, his
mentor in this topic, without whom the writing of this comment would be impossible.
1. As of 2010, this number was approximately 19%, with half of the disabled respondents
reporting a “severe” disability. Nearly One in Five People Have a Disability in the US, Census
Bureau Reports, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 25, 2012), https://www.census.gov/new
sroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html.
2. 42 U.S.C § 12101 (2009).
3. Tim Berners-Lee, The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future, WORLD WIDE WEB
CONSORTIUM (Aug. 1996), https://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/1996/ppf.html.
4. See id.
5. 42 U.S.C § 12181(7)(A)–(L) (2014).
6. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id.
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Co.,9 holding that the ADA only governed physical locations.10 The circuits
split over the next few years: the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits tended to interpret
the ADA narrowly, ruling for defendants, while the First and Ninth Circuits
construed the ADA broadly, finding it governed more than just physical
locations, and, therefore, ruled for plaintiffs.11 These splits continued when
plaintiffs began bringing suits against entities based on the lack of accessibility
of electronic communications12 and websites on the Internet. For instance, in
2006, the Ninth Circuit, in an issue of first impression in National Federation of
the Blind v. Target Corp.,13 ruled that a retailer’s website was a place of public
accommodation because it provided indirect access to the store itself and,
therefore, was governed by Title III of the ADA.14 Over the next decade,
litigants continued to dispute the definition of “place of public accommodation”
and courts continued to diverge in their holdings.
This Comment argues that courts and scholars have given insufficient
attention to the concept of place. Place means more than simply “a discrete
physical location.” The law, far from being a structural entity that forms ex
nihilo, arises in part out of human language, which in turn arises from human
experience. This Comment offers evidence that both the average person and the
court should conceive of “place” in a broad sense. To do so, this Comment
draws on jurisprudence outside the field of disability law, namely the realms of
trespass and search-and-seizure.
Part I provides an overview of the text and legislative history of the ADA,
along with varying case law which treats non-physical spaces as places of public
accommodation. Part II analyzes philosophy and legal scholarship on the
interpretation of place as a nonphysical concept and surveys different solutions
to the problem of websites as public accommodation under the ADA.
Additionally, this Comment demonstrates that law applicable to the Internet
outside the context of the ADA, such as courts’ rulings on Internet searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment and trespass to chattels under tort law,
has been applied to the Internet already and consistently treats the Internet in the
same manner it does a physical location. Finally, Part III points to the
Department of Justice’s potential recognition of this fact as they prepare to apply
the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 to publicly-operated websites
under Title II of the ADA, and argues that it should do likewise to Title III.

9. 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997).
10. Id. at 1022 (Martin, B., dissenting).
11. See generally infra Part A (discussing how Courts from various circuits determine what
is a place and why this distinction is significant).
12. See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
13. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N. D. Cal. 2006).
14. Id. at 956.
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GOING PLACES: COURTS INTERPRET “PLACE” AND WHY IT MATTERS
A.

Enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act

Until 1990, the most important predecessor of the ADA was Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“the Act”).15 While the Act made steps toward
ensuring federal rights for people with disabilities, the language of the Act
primarily encompassed federal programs, and, therefore was not as effective as
disability activists hoped it would be.16 During the Reagan administration, some
disability lobbyists sought to classify “disability” as a right under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 while others argued a separate act would accomplish more
because disability rights concerned specific matters.17 By 1990, lobbyists
convinced Congress to enact the ADA, the most comprehensive American law
aimed at protecting the rights of people with disabilities, and encouraging them
to flourish publicly.18
Legislative history confirms that Congress sought to provide a national
mandate that would improve the lives of the disabled.19 According to Congress,
a primary purpose of the law was to curb discrimination against the disabled.20
Congress stated that discrimination encompassed “segregation, exclusion, or
other denial of benefits, services, or opportunities to people with disabilities that
are as effective and meaningful as those provided to others.”21 Discrimination,

15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797. (2012).
16. For the primary example, Section 794 of the statute reads:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
Section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794.
17. DORIS AMES FLEISCHER & FRIEDA AMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM
CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 89 (2001).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
19. The introduction to the House Report for the enacted law states that the purpose of the
ADA is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this Act on behalf the individuals with disabilities; and (4)
to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas
of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), pt.2 at 329 (1990).
20. Id. at 274.
21. Id. at 29.
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moreover, can arise either through design or by effect; it can be the result of
intent or “thoughtlessness.”22
Specifically, Congress found that discrimination occurred in areas such as
“public transportation, public services, and telecommunications.”23
In
addressing the isolation many of the disabled experience due to discrimination,
Congress noted that many people with disabilities do not attend movies, sporting
events, the theater, restaurants, grocery stores, or churches,24 because of
transportation, architecture, or communications barriers to intent, entry, or
participation.25
In an effort to overcome such discrimination, Congress enacted the ADA,
thereby legislating the removal of barriers to public participation of the disabled,
both socially and vocationally.26 In the ADA, Congress defines a disability as
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual.”27 The conception of a major life activity is quite
broad, but encompasses many of the standard activities one would engage in
frequently, such as attending church or visiting a grocery store.28
There are several titles of the ADA. Title II governs the practices of
governmental organizations,29 while Title III, which this Comment addresses,
governs employers and places of public accommodation.30 According to title III
of the ADA, “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.”31 Congress included a wide spectrum of
entities under the umbrella of a public accommodation, such as auditoriums,
private schools, grocery stores, public transportation, theaters, and other places
of entertainment.32 The ADA provides that discrimination encompasses denial
22. Id. Congress also refers to the lack of careful design without the intent to discriminate as
“benign neglect.” Id.
23. H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), pt.2 at 329 (1990).
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 35. These findings came from testimony of numerous people with disabilities,
compiled in a report by the National Council on Disability. Id. at 34.
26. Id. at 22–23.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
28. A major life activity can include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working” as well as the use of any major bodily
function. Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B).
29. Id. § 12131.
30. Id. § 12181.
31. Id. § 12182(a).
32. The comprehensive list is laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)–(L) as follows:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is
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of participation in a public accommodation or participation on unequal
grounds.33
B.

Pre-Internet Approaches to the Question of Place

Because of the statute’s expansiveness, it took time for the courts to begin to
address what could be classified as a place of public accommodation beyond the
statute. Other examinations of the applicability of the statute have neglected to
examine several pre-Internet cases interpreting Sections 12181 and 12182,
which shed important light on the courts’ possible approaches.
The first case to extensively address this question was Carparts Distribution
Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc.34 The First
Circuit heard the case on appeal after the district court dismissed it under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35 The plaintiff, Ronald Senter, was diagnosed
with HIV in 1986 and with AIDS in 1991; he died in 1993.36 Senter was a
member of a health plan offered by the defendant, who, in 1991 announced that
it would limit benefits to AIDS patients to $25,000; general patients received $1
million in coverage.37 The plaintiff alleged, both to the district court and to the
First Circuit on appeal, that the defendant, knew he had been diagnosed with
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such
proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition
or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or
other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
33. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
34. 37 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing the definition of “place of
accommodation”).
35. Id. at 14 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as a basis for dismissal of the suit on a failure to
state a claim).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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AIDS, instituted the new policy, and failed to provide him with standard benefits
outside the purview of that policy.38 He brought suit contending that this policy
violated both a state discrimination statute and the ADA.39 The district court
interpreted a public accommodation as applying exclusively to a physical
structure “with definite physical boundaries which a person physically enters for
the purpose of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services.”40 In contrast, the
court of appeals found that the term “public accommodation” was ambiguous on
its face.41 It went on to say, however, that the legislative history of the ADA,42
as well as Congress’s inclusion of “travel services” in its list of public
accommodations, suggested that the phrase “public accommodation” was meant
to encompass more than physical structures.43 The court suggested that a legal
outcome where, for example, a disabled customer was protected when
purchasing services in a store but was unprotected when purchasing those same
services over the telephone would be irrational and an “absurd result.”44
Nevertheless, the court did not rule on the plaintiff’s claim due to the sparseness
of the offered facts, and, instead, remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings.45
The other significant pre-Internet litigation case to positively interpret the
ADA as applying to non-physical structures was Rendon v. Valleycrest
Productions, Ltd.46 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that Valleycrest
Productions and the ABC television network violated the ADA by constructing
a phone process for participation in the quiz show “Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire?” which screened out disabled (particularly deaf) individuals who
wanted to participate.47 This process involved a recorded message with various
questions to which the participants must respond by pressing keys on the
telephone keypad within the allocated time.48 Several plaintiffs who were
unable to participate in the process either because of upper mobility impairments
or inability to hear the recorded questions, brought suit because there were no
alternative services available.49
The district court granted ABC and
Valleycrest’s motion to dismiss, finding that the ADA did not apply since the
telephone process was not a physical location and did not qualify as a place of

38. Id.
39. Id. at 14–15.
40. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 18
(1st Cir. 1994).
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. 294 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
47. Id. at 1281.
48. Id. at 1280.
49. Id. at 1281.
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public accommodation.50 Defendants argued that, though their process did
screen out people with certain disabilities, they nevertheless fell outside the
ADA because the contestant hotline did not prevent plaintiff’s physical access
to the location at which the services were held.51 The court found this argument
unpersuasive; it pointed to the ADA as specifically delineating processes that
tend to screen out disabled individuals as a form of discrimination.52 The court
further stated that, regardless of whether it took place off-site, exclusion, done
with the intention to screen out or reduce access for people with disabilities
constituted prohibiting access to a public accommodation.53
C. Courts Apply Section 12182 Exclusively to Physical Structures
Two other circuit court cases contrast with Carparts and Rendon in their
ruling on the definition of public accommodation under Section 12182 of the
ADA. The first is Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.54 In Parker, an employee
sued her employer alleging violation of the ADA.55 The plaintiff argued that,
because the employer’s insurance policy provided longer-term benefits to those
who became physically disabled than to those who became mentally disabled, it
unnecessarily restricted her access to a public accommodation.56 The District
Court dismissed Parker’s Title III claim; on appeal, the circuit court reversed.57
After a motion for a rehearing en banc, however, the Circuit Court reversed and
reaffirmed the district court’s dismissal.58 The Circuit Court stated that the
insurance policy was not offered by a place of public accommodation; Parker
could not go to an insurance office to receive the policy, but rather obtained it
directly from her employer.59 Furthermore, the court found that, even if the
insurance policy was offered in a place of public accommodation, there still
would not be a violation of the ADA.60 The court interpreted Section 12182 as
applying to services offered by a place of public accommodation and excluding
the contents of those services; a bookstore, therefore, must provide access to its
books, but it is not required to stock large print or braille books.61

50. Id.
51. Id. at 1283.
52. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002).
53. Id. at 1286.
54. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
55. Id. at 1008.
56. Id. at 1008–09. The plaintiff also brought her claim under the Employment Retirement
Income and Security Act (ERISA) and Title I of the ADA; discussion of those claims is omitted.
57. Id. at 1009.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1011–12.
60. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1012–13 (6th Cir. 1997).
61. Id. at 1012.
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Several years later, Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.62 presented
nearly identical circumstances to Parker. In both cases, an employee purchased
a group insurance policy, which offered long-term benefits to those with
physical disabilities, but restricted benefits for mentally disabled employees to
twenty-four months.63 The insurance company Fox patronized had a more
extensive and more costly policy available; the plaintiff argued that Fox should
have purchased that policy and its failure to do so constituted a violation of Title
III of the ADA because it offered a plan that discriminated against people with
disabilities.64 The district court granted Fox’s motion for summary judgment,
and Weyer appealed.65 The court gave an almost identical ruling to Parker.
First, the court held that the insurance carrier was not a place of public
accommodation because it did not offer its services through its own physical
locations and, therefore, there was no “nexus” between the two.66 Second, the
court stated, as in Parker, that Congress intended for Section 12182 to govern
the services offered by a place of public accommodation, but not the content of
those services.67 Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of Fox’s
motion.68
This history is important because the subsequent application of the ADA to
websites—or lack thereof—cannot be fully understood without this context.
Past scholarship on this subject has generally given only cursory attention to the
pre-Internet jurisprudence, but context always matters when presenting history
and when advocating for a particular jurisprudential step. Now that the
foundation has been laid, the subsequent sections trace courts’ applications of
the ADA to privately owned and operated websites.
D. The ADA and the Internet Under Section 12182
1.

Access Now, Target, and the “Nexus Test”

Eventually, courts began to address whether websites constitute public places.
The advent of extended jurisprudence addressing the link between Title III of
the ADA and the Internet arose in 2002, with Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest
Airlines, Co.69 Unlike prior cases, there was no single incident of discrimination
which resulted in the lawsuit. Instead, Access Now, an advocacy organization
for the disabled, and Robert Gumson, a blind individual, sought injunctive relief

62. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
63. Id. at 1107–08.
64. Id. at 1108.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1114–15 (citing Parker, 294 F.3d at 1010–11). The language of a “nexus” between
a place and a nonphysical structure will become significant in this analysis.
67. Id. at 1115.
68. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
69. 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (S. D. Fla. 2002).
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and a declaratory judgment against Southwest Airlines.70 Southwest Airlines
was the first airline to create its own website.71 In arguing Southwest violated
the ADA by virtue of the inaccessibility of its website, plaintiffs asserted that
the website was unusable by individuals using a screen reader—a piece of
assistive technology that transforms information on a screen into synthesized
speech.72 The plaintiffs contended that, by failing to provide alternative text to
improve the accessibility of its website and by failing to include a “skip
navigation” link that would allow blind individuals to bypass the navigation bars
on the website, Southwest was violating Section 12182 of the ADA.73
In deciding whether Southwest’s website was a place of public
accommodation under Sections 12181 and 12182, the court used the same
standard as the court in Rendon.74 According to the court, the “first step in
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”75
The court did not agree with plaintiff’s attempt to combine different terms in
Section 12181— namely, “exhibition,” “display,” and “sales establishment” —
to assert that Southwest fell under the definition of place of public
accommodation.76 Instead, the court interpreted the statute such that “[t]he
general terms, “exhibition,” “display,” and “sales establishment,” are limited to
their corresponding specifically enumerated terms, all of which are physical,
concrete structures, namely: “motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
stadium;” “museum, library, gallery;” and “bakery, grocery store, clothing store,
hardware store, shopping center,” respectively.”77 The plaintiffs relied on the
holding from Rendon to argue there was a nexus between the services Southwest
offered on their website and the physical services offered (air travel).78 The
court disagreed, saying:
whereas the defendants in Rendon conceded, and the Eleventh Circuit
agreed, that the game show at issue took place at a physical, public
accommodation (a concrete television studio), and that the fast finger
telephone selection process used to select contestants tended to screen
out disabled individuals, the Internet website at issue here is neither a
physical, public accommodation itself as defined by the ADA, nor a
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1315 (citing Southwest Airlines Fact Sheet, (last accessed Oct. 16, 2002),
http://www.southwest.com/about_ swa/press /factsheet.html.).
72. Id. at 1316.
73. Id. Travel websites can be particularly complicated for screen reader users, as their forms
are often multi-page, contain dynamic content and sometimes require timed responses. This fact
has not changed in the intervening years since this case.
74. Id. at 1317.
75. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317 (S. D. Fla.
2002).
76. Id. at 1318–19.
77. Id. at 1319.
78. Id.
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means to accessing a concrete space such as the specific television
studio in Rendon.79
In dismissing the claim, the court relied particularly on the convergence of (1)
a website with (2) a verifiable, unchanging physical location not in terms of
services but in terms of offering of services.80 The court reasoned that since a
website did not exist in any one location, the plaintiffs could not prove a denial
of a particular service.81 A contrasting, frequently-cited case would come four
years later with National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.82
Much like Southwest, this suit concerned the accessibility of the interface of
a website operated by an already-existing service.83 Through Target.com, an
individual can “access information on store locations and hours, refill a
prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print coupons to
redeem at a store” as well as purchase items from the store itself.84 The plaintiffs
stated that building an accessible website is relatively simple and not
economically prohibitive; the primary requirements are embedded text inside
graphics and the ability for screen readers to read navigation links.85
The plaintiffs brought suit under several state and federal laws,
including Title III of the ADA; the defendant then removed the case
to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.86 The defendant and the plaintiff both argued, implicitly, based
on a nexus theory. The defendant denied discrimination, asserting that
the inaccessibility of Target.com was not covered since the company
was not denying access to the Target stores themselves.87 Conversely,
the plaintiff’s argued that, because Target.com was a hub by which
one could receive services traditionally received at physical stores—
such as refilling a prescription—the inaccessibility of Target.com was
functionally a denial of access to the physical store as well.88
The court addressed several of the defendant’s Title III arguments. First, it
held that denial of access “off-site” could still amount to discrimination if the
service offered by the entity itself was denied or restricted.89 The court held that,
79. Id. at 1321.
80. Id.
81. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S. D. Fla.
2002). Thus, because the Internet website, southwest.com, does not exist in any particular
geographical location, Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Southwest’s website impedes their
access to a specific, physical, concrete space such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel
agency. Id.
82. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N. D. Cal. 2006).
83. Id. at 949–50.
84. Id. at 949.
85. Id. at 949–50.
86. Id. at 949–51.
87. Id. at 952.
88. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 952 (N. D. Cal. 2006).
89. Id. at 953.
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to the extent that the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claims of
discrimination were false purely because the denial did not occur at a physical
location, the arguments failed.90 Furthermore, the court held that, even where a
physical location existed, denial of direct access to the physical location did not
constitute the only ground for discrimination.91 Relying on Rendon, the court
held that, if there was a physical location offering particular services, even if
those services extended beyond the physical location itself, then the failure to
maintain equal access for the disabled and nondisabled alike could constitute
discrimination.92 Thus, it is not simply access to the physical location that must
be equal; there must also be equal access to all of the services provided through
or by that location.93 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have continued this line of
thinking, repeatedly upholding the “nexus” test as recently as 2017.94
2. After Target: Courts Address Internet-Exclusive Services—Netflix, and
Scribd
Eventually courts began to take on cases in which the accessibility of a service
was not tied to any particular physical location at all. These cases have become
especially prevalent in light of the reality that many people now obtain certain
goods and services exclusively via the Internet itself. This Comment examines
four illustrative cases, from different circuits, and their approaches to this
question over the last few years.
The first case, Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.,95 was litigated in the same district as
Target. Netflix is a video rental service that, since 2008, has offered an
increasing number of productions available to be streamed through its website.96
Starting in 2009, Netflix announced plans to begin providing subtitles for their
programming, with successive announcements indicating further
development.97 Cullen filed a class-action lawsuit, arguing that deaf subscribers
reasonably relied on them in purchasing their subscriptions and anticipated that
closed captioning would be forthcoming.98 Though Cullen brought suit under
California state law, the court’s holding is relevant because, in part of his
argument, Cullen relied on an ADA violation which would also violate the state
law in question.99 However, the court found no “nexus” between Netflix’s

90. Id. at 953–54.
91. Id. at 952–55.
92. Id. at 953.
93. Id. at 953–55.
94. See Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017).
95. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
96. Id. at 1020–21.
97. Id. at 1021.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1023.
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website and any particular physical location.100 Netflix offered its streaming
service exclusively online, so the court determined that, under Target’s
precedent, the nexus test failed and the streaming service was not a place of
public accommodation.101
The second case involving Netflix, National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix,
Inc.,102 came to the opposite conclusion. Like in Cullen, the National
Association of the Deaf brought suit under the ADA, claiming that only a small
number of Netflix’s shows were captioned and that Netflix failed to categorize
accurately its captioned films, thereby prohibiting deaf individuals from making
use of Netflix’s personalized film recommendations.103 The plaintiffs argued
that Netflix fell under several of the examples of places of public
accommodation in 42 U.S.C. § 12181, and thus was analogous to a regular
physical store.104 Agreeing with the First Circuit’s decision in Carparts, the
court said that a decision to exclude from the ADA those businesses that market
their services via the Internet would “run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and
would severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities fully
enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately
to other members of the general public.”105
The court went on to state that the categories of public accommodation are
exemplary, and not comprehensive.106 Thus, it did not matter whether the
plaintiffs could demonstrate that Netflix matched one or more examples in any
of the categories. Rather, it mattered that its inclusion in any given category
could be justified.107 Finally, the court rejected defendant’s argument that their
streaming service was not a place of public accommodation because it was
accessed primarily in private residences.108 The court stated that the ADA
“covers “the services ‘of’ a public accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a
public accommodation.””109 To hold otherwise would exempt such entities as
plumbers and deliverymen from the ADA entirely.110 Finally, the most recent
100. Id. at 1023–24.
101. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The court did
not address whether there could be a nexus between Netflix’s online website and the distribution
centers from which it mailed the DVDs it also offered as an alternative to streaming. Id.
102. 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
103. Id. at 199.
104. Id. at 200. The four categories plaintiffs referred to were “place of recreation,” “place of
exhibition and entertainment,” “sales or rental establishment,” and “service establishment.” Id.
(quoting portions of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012)).
105. Id. (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d
12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994)).
106. Id. at 201.
107. Id.
108. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2012).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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decision rejecting the nexus test is National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd,
Inc.111 Scribd is an online service that provides access to more than 40 million
books for a monthly subscription fee.112 The plaintiffs asserted that, since Scribd
had an entirely visual interface, it was incompatible with screen readers, and
therefore discriminated against the blind in a place of public accommodation.113
The court ruled that the text of Section 12182 was ambiguous on its face and
enumerated the various circuit splits ruling different ways on the question.114 In
addition, the court found that, according to canons of statutory construction and
legislative history, the ADA is best interpreted in a broad, liberal and
technologically-evolving fashion.115 Although the court ruled that plaintiffs had
a successful claim and denied Scribd’s motion to dismiss, it did not rule on
whether Scribd fell under any of the categories of public accommodation
described in Section 12181.116
II.

GEOGRAPHY, SPATIALITY AND THE INTERNET

This Comment will now move from the relevant case law to the argument that
the term “places” means more than a discrete physical location. Before
addressing the legal question, it is necessary to lay a philosophical foundation
for the argument. As demonstrated above, courts seem reluctant to examine the
possibility of websites as places in the conventional sense of the word. While
the statement that websites themselves are not places in terms of physical
locations is obvious, the idea that place as a concept is restricted only to the
physical realm is less obvious. This section outlines several approaches to this
question: the first is philosophical and examines the concept of spatiality in
particular and the Internet’s relationship to physical geography. It is followed
by an examination of ADA scholarship on place along with courts’ treatment of
place in the context of trespass and search and seizure.
A.

Place, Space, and Philosophy

Before explicating the physicality of the Internet itself, it is worth briefly
discussing the philosophical conception of place, and whether it is justifiable to
conceive of place as more variegated idea than simply a bounded physical
location.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

97 F. Supp. 3d 565 (D. Vt. 2015).
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id. at 568–71.
Id. at 573–74.
Id. at 576.
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There are few philosophers who have investigated the idea of place.117 One
of the most accomplished is Jeff Malpas,118 whose area of work includes
“philosophical topography.” Malpas analyzes the relationship between place
and mind to arrive at an externalist conception of place.119 Far from being a
contingent feature of human experience, place is one of the primary conceptions
humans use to orient themselves in the world.120 “Place” is difficult to define
because the word is used in so many ways.121 The primary sense of place is
bound up with the concepts of dimensionality and location.122 The concept
“place,” however, is bound up with the concept of space, whose meaning is also
debated. While “space” is understood exclusively in terms of physical

117. Contemporary philosophers of phenomenology give particular attention to the subject—
Bachelard, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger perhaps being the most well-known. See
generally EDWARD CASEY, THE FATE OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY (1997) (a seminal
treatment which covers the history of place in western philosophy in exhaustive detail).
118. Malpas is currently a distinguished professor at the University of Tasmania in Australia.
See generally J. E. MALPAS, PLACE AND EXPERIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL TOPOGRAPHY (1999).
119. Externalism is a theory that posits that one’s inner life at least partially comprises external
factors, including location. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
In its most general formulation, externalism with regard to a property K is a thesis
about how K is individuated. It says that whether a creature has K or not depends in
part on facts about how the creature is related to its external environment. In other
words, it is metaphysically possible that there are two intrinsically indistinguishable
creatures, only one of which has property K, as a result of them being situated in
different environment. To give a trivial example, externalism is true of mosquito bites
since having them requires having been bitten by a mosquito. A mark on the skin
created by careful micro-surgery is not a mosquito bite, even if it is intrinsically
indistinguishable from a real one.
Externalism About Mental Content, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
120. Malpas explained:
There is good reason to suppose that the human relationship to place is a fundamental
structure in what makes possible the sort of life that is characteristically human, while
also being determining, in some way that requires clarification, of human identity. In
that case, it is not surprising that place, and associated notions of spatiality and
embodiment, should have come to such prominence in so many different disciplines
and in the work of so many different writers and researchers .
MALPAS, supra note 118, at 13.
121. The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of place extends over five pages, but Malpas
elucidates five main senses of the word:
(i) a definite but open space, particularly a bounded, open space within a city or town;
(ii) a more 534eneralized sense of space, extension, dimensionality or ‘room’ (and,
understood as identical with a certain conception of space, place may, in this sense, be
opposed to time); (iii) location or position within some order (whether it be a spatial or
some other kind of ordering, hierarchical or not); (iv) a particular locale or environment
that has a character of its own; and (v) an abode or that within which something exists
or within which it dwells.
Id. at 19–22.
122. Id. at 25.
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extension, “place” is restricted to the realm of physical location.123 Although
Malpas does not limit the idea of place to the idea of the human experience in a
physical location, he does argue for the integral nature of place to human
experience itself.124
For the purposes of this Comment, Malpas’s exploration of the objective and
subjective dimensions of space is more important than his exploration of the
relationship between place and mind. If space goes beyond simply a dimension
or “container” for various physical phenomena—as in much of modern
philosophy125—but must also be understood in subjective appropriation, then
there is room to consider both space and place as extending beyond the physical
realm into areas that mediate a different idea of space. Malpas argues that the
human conception of space is, in part, dependent on the fact that one is related
to objects within it.126 One cannot conceive of space apart from one’s own
connection to other bodies within space. In light of this basic fact, Malpas
distinguishes between egocentric and allocentric space. Egocentric space is
centered on a creature’s own experience or activity, whereas allocentric space is
centered on a particular feature of the environment.127
These philosophical considerations matter because, if place is related to
experience in this way, then physical location is merely a “jumping-off point”
for understanding the conceptual realm of place; it is not a completely restrictive
category. Although conceptions of “place” must take into account the basic
features of a physical location, one can do so while still incorporating websites
into that scheme. A key way of doing so—and a way that all humans do, all of
the time—is through the use of metaphors.
B.

The Georgraphy of the Net and Metaphors of Place

The Internet is not a physical location. Neither, however, is it a free-floating
concept totally severed from various physical concepts. One can see this by way
of metaphors applied to the Internet. Dan Hunter,128 in his seminal work
Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommunist,129 briefly
outlined the history of metaphors surrounding cyberspace. The Internet is a
“frontier;” people “cross into a landscape unlike any which humanity has
experienced before;” a “region without physical shape or form.”130 Websites are

123. Id. at 27–28.
124. Id. at 31–32.
125. This includes Descartes, Newton, Kant, and Swinburne. See id. at 28–30.
126. MALPAS, supra note 118, at 49.
127. Id. at 53.
128. Dan Hunter is the “Robert F. Irwin IV Term Assistant Professor of Legal Studies,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.” See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 455 n.85.
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divided between public and private, with “walls” and “locks” that can be
constructed or broken down.131
Hunter draws on the interaction theory of metaphor, particularly as articulated
by George Lakoff, to explain the relevance of metaphor to cyberspace.132
“[I]nteraction theory . . . discusses the role that metaphor plays in structuring the
way we think.”133 In interaction theory, the “source” of the metaphor—the
domain from which the metaphorical features are drawn— and the target—the
subject of the metaphor itself—interact such that cognitive information is
transferred from source to target.134 The target and source relate to one another
through a system of relationships, creating a new set of assumptions that cannot
be expressed in any other way.135 Lakoff draws upon a body of empirical
evidence to argue that humans in general have a series of common cognitive
metaphors underlying their thinking; thus, linguistic metaphors shape the way
we consider broader concepts.136
Hunter argues on the basis of the ubiquity of spatial metaphors to the Internet,
that place is a common cognitive metaphor that people will likely always apply
to the Internet in general and websites in particular.137 Recent scholarship in the
fields of computer science and geography has explored the significance of
physicality to the Internet, and the various ways it effects and interacts with
world geography. Kellerman maps several spatial dimensions onto the Internet;
the most relevant for our purposes are information, communications and screen
spaces.138 When combined, the features of these spaces strongly resemble the

131. Id. at 455–56.
132. Id. at 472.
133. Id. at 465.
134. Id. at 467.
135. Hunter illustrates the basics of the theory with the metaphor “man is a wolf”:
For instance, “man is a wolf” is not about the wolf qua thing, but rather the system of
relationships that are signaled by the presence of the word “wolf.” When we hear the
metaphor, we are influenced by all the commonplaces of the source system. The source
system selects and emphasizes some features of the target system while suppressing
others. So we interpret “wolf” on the basis of our knowledge and “associated
commonplaces” about wolves. When presented with the metaphor, we are
immediately assailed with recollections about wolves being “ferocious, territorial, and
possessive.” The source selects and emphasizes those “wolf-like” aspects that are
already present in our view of man.
Id. at 468 (internal citations omitted).
136. Id. at 469–70 (offering as a particular example the mapping of features of war onto legal
and other types of arguments).
137. See id. at 481. Hunter argues for policy reasons that the overuse of such a metaphor will
have deleterious consequences of people’s rights of access online. Hunter’s argument is powerful
and deserves engagement; subject matter and space considerations preclude discussion of his policy
arguments herein.
138. AHARON KELLERMAN, GEOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INTERNET 28 (2016).
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conceptions of place outlined above by Malpas.139 Finally, even the nonphysical aspects of the Internet are inevitably grounded in the physical structures
of satellites, fiber-optic cables and computers.140
C. Various Approaches to the Question: Expansive and Narrow, Nexus and
Storefront Tests
Like the various circuits, the realm of legal scholarship is divided on the
question of whether a website can be considered a place of public
accommodation. The majority of scholars argue along the lines of Target’s
nexus test, with some nuancing it and reaching for something like a
commercial/noncommercial distinction.141
Scholarly arguments about the ADA’s jurisdiction of the Internet are
comparatively rare, and did not appear until the early 2000s. In the early 2000s,
legal scholars began discussing the best ways for courts to ensure accessibility
on the Internet. As early as 2001, scholars were arguing for a broad application
of Title III of the ADA to Internet websites.142 Pre-Southwest, courts and
scholars both acknowledged that Congress likely intended to govern more than
simply physical locations under Title III of the ADA.143 Nevertheless, the
Internet is not identical to physical locations, and Adam Schloss144 in particular
raised concerns about the long-term financial viability of websites governed
under Title III.145 Michael O. Finnigan and Heather M. Lutz146 argue further
that, on textual grounds, the statutory language of the ADA excludes Internet
websites by default under “canon expression unius (the inclusion of some items

139. Information and communications spaces constitute the realms whereby users obtain
various pieces of data and send and receive it with other parties; the “screen-space” of the Internet
structures these interactions in a visual way, thus combining the subjective and objective notions
of space in a non-physical way. Of interest is the fact that Kellerman never discusses the oral
interface used by most blind people in the form of screen readers. See id. §§ 2.4.1–2.4.3 (2016).
140. Barney Warf, Global Geographies of the Internet § 1.4 (2016). This reality would suggest
that the nexus test discussed above is unnecessarily narrow and fails to take into account not only
the nonphysical spatiality of the Internet but websites unavoidably links to physical structures.
141. See infra for a comparison of the content/non-content distinction with a service/nonservice distinction.
142. Adam N. Schloss, WEB-SIGHT FOR VISUALLY-DISABLED PEOPLE: DOES TITLE III
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT APPLY TO INTERNET WEBSITES?, 35
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 49–50 (2001).
143. Schloss points out several notable media not discussed in the above sections of this article,
including correspondence courses, telephone access and mandatory closed captioning capabilities
for televisions. Id. at 46–48.
144. J.D. Columbia Law School, 2002.
145. Schloss proposed that Congress incentivize compliance with Title III by subsidizing
larger websites, in hopes of increasing profitability of compliance and increasing the likelihood that
competitors would then proceed to raise their own accessibility standards. Schloss, supra note 142,
at 55–57.
146. Contributing Members, 2006–2007 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
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in a statute indicates the exclusion of other items not included in the statute).”147
O’Finnigan and Lutz go on to say that Congress did not amend Title III to
address telecommunications, thus evidencing a clear intent to excluded
intangible access from the definition of place of public accommodation.148
Finally in addressing Target specifically, they argue that Target’s website does
not satisfy a nexus test. Target is a legal corporation and not a physical entity;
thus it is impossible for Target’s website to be linked to any particular physical
location.149 This argument rests on shaky foundations. Legally, while it is
possible to distinguish a corporation itself from the physical locations it operates,
pressing this distinction in an ADA context could easily allow corporations to
evade responsibilities under the act by, for example, claiming that the store
owners and managers were responsible for each location’s compliance, thus
immunizing the corporation from any litigation.
The approaches of Adam Schloss and Heather Lutz are not favored by all
scholars, as courts began applying the nexus test, or something like it, to Title
III Internet cases before them.150 Typical jurisprudence advocating the nexus
test matched the descriptions and arguments of the courts. The nexus test “best
reflects the language of the ADA” and “best reflects the nature of the
Internet.”151 The discrimination provisions of the ADA ensure that, although
there must be a connection between the website and a physical location, the
barriers to access need not be tangible.152 Richard Moberly argues for a broader
147. Michael O. Finnigan, Jr., Brian C. Griffith, & Heather M. Lutz, ACCOMMODATING
CYBERSPACE: APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO THE
INTERNET, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795, 1818 (2007).
148. Id. at 1820.
149. Id. at 1823. This approach is similar to that in Southwest, though going farther in asserting
that a corporation is always legally distinct from a physical location such that services offered by
that corporation would never be governed under Section 12182 of the ADA. Though understated,
this is a key plank in their argument. The nexus test is unintelligible if a distinction between a
corporation and a physical location is made in this manner; thus leaving little if any room for the
ADA to affect the Internet at all.
150. See supra pp. 12–20, regarding the discussion of Southwest and Target.
151. Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the
“Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963, 978, 988 (2004).
152. Id. at 985–86. Thus Moberly states:
Under the nexus approach, then, a connection must exist between a physical place of
public accommodation and the discriminatory action or inaccessible service. This
connection, however, is not limited only to whether an individual with a disability can
physically access a place of public accommodation. By referencing discriminatory
actions taken with regard to a broad range of activities of a public accommodation, in
addition to the accommodation’s facilities, the statutory text indicates that the
connection simply must be toward some aspect of the place of public accommodation’s
offerings to the public. The nexus can involve both tangible and intangible
discriminatory actions, including refusing to provide auxiliary aids to ensure effective
communication or failing to make reasonable modifications in policies or procedures
to provide an individual with a disability full use of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.
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interpretation of the nexus test, under which courts should treat a website as “a
means by which the public is able to enjoy the ‘goods, services, . . . privileges,
[and] advantages’ of a physical place of public accommodation.”153 This
approach is nearly identical to the view of the nexus test the California court
applied in Target and has been popular with many courts since then.
Several scholars, while favoring the nexus test, prefer to speak instead in terms
of commercial versus noncommercial distinctions among websites.154 Scholars
interpret this distinction in both a broad and a narrow fashion. Trevor
Crowley155 offers a narrow “storefront test,” which has similar language to the
classic nexus test:
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a substantial
amount of its goods or services from a physical facility may be subject to Title
III if the facility and the website together form an entity that would otherwise
fall under one of the enumerated places of public accommodation. 156
Crowley differentiates his approach from the nexus test by arguing that what
is important is (a) the physical nature of the goods or services on offer and (b)
the link of the website to a discrete, physical location, but not (c) the symmetry
between what a website offers for sale and what the physical location offers for
sale.157 In fact, the physical location might not have to sell anything if the
website itself were operating as a store. So, for example, Netflix’s mail-order
DVD service would be governed under Title III while it’s “watch instantly”
streaming service would not.158
Another popular but broader distinction is between commercial and
noncommercial websites. This requirement is less stringent than either a nexus
or storefront test.159 All a website would need to do to fall under the commercial
definition is affect interstate commerce and sell services similar enough to the
enumerated establishments in the statute.160 A similar approach suggests that as
Id. at 986.
153. Id. at 995.
154. See generally Trevor Crowley, Wheelchair Ramps In Cyberspace: Bringing The
Americans With Disabilities Act Into The 21st Century, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (2013); Nikki D.
Kessling, Why The Target “Nexus Test” Leaves Disabled Americans Disconnected: A Better
Approach To Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites Are “Places Of Public
Accommodation”, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 991 (2008).
155. “J.D. Candidate, April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
An earlier version of this paper received the 2013 Student Paper Award from the Disabilities
Division, Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), and was presented at the SSSP 2013
Annual Meeting.” Crowley, supra note 155, at 651.
156. Id. at 652.
157. Id. at 686–87.
158. Id. at 688. The difficulty with Crowley’s analysis on this point is that he seems to have
failed to predict that an entity could offer goods or services through a storefront-like website that
was nevertheless linked to no physical location. See infra pp. 37–38.
159. Kessling, supra note 155, at 996–97.
160. Id. at 1025.
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long as a website is linked to one of the twelve entities listed in Title III, it is
irrelevant whether the website itself qualifies as a place. Instead, as long as the
website is maintained and operated from a physical location, Title III can govern
the website.161
The most recent argument in favor of applying the ADA to certain websites
dispenses with the “place” defense entirely and is similar to a distinction that
will shortly follow: namely, that of “content” on offer at a website.162 The
procedure is as follows:
Procedurally, the content test would follow in two parts. First, the court would
classify the material provided by the website. Second, once the court has
categorized the website, it would see if what the website provides falls within
one of the categories provided by Congress in its definition of public
accommodation. Take, for example, a website that sells clothing. First, since
the website sells clothing, the court could classify it as a clothing store or sales
establishment. Second, the court would then look at the categories provided by
Congress in its definition of public accommodation. Since “clothing store” and
“sales establishment” are two categories included in Congress’s definition, this
website would be a public accommodation and subject to Title III of the ADA.163
Finally, there are arguments that the nexus, storefront and commerce tests are
all insufficient, and that the Internet itself should be considered a place. The
Internet as place is captured in the metaphorical language used to describe it.
One “surfs the web;” one can even “enter” or “leave” certain public fora, such
as social media. On this account, “[w]hat constitutes a place is more of a social
construct than a matter of defining precisely what characteristics must be present

161. Kenneth Kronstadt, Looking Behind the Curtain: Applying Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act to the Businesses Behind Commercial Websites, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 111, 132–33
(2007). Kronstad’s position is subtly but importantly different from the nexus test:
Considering a business operating a website in this manner renders obsolete theoretical
arguments of whether the Internet itself is a place. This approach instead shifts the
focus of the debate regarding the public accommodation provision away from what
venues should accommodate the disabled to the types of commercial services Congress
intended to be made available free from discrimination. An entity providing the types
of commercial services Congress included within the twelve categories should qualify
as a place of public accommodation even if it serves the public solely via a website.
The PACE approach is consistent with the language of the ADA, the purpose behind
the ADA’s enactment, and the nature of the Internet, yet it allows the ADA to adapt to
a changing world without disturbing the plain meaning of the word “place.”
Id. This approach is broader than Crowley’s, since it does not require the website to be purveying
physical goods. In that way, however, it strikes this writer as confused; Kronstadt would appear to
want to have his cake and eat it too, conceiving of a website itself as wholly accidental to the
existence of most commercial entities. But why should the mere fact that, for example, a website
is linked to a physical server automatically put it under the umbrella of Title III simply because it
has a “physical” location?
162. Carly Schiff, Cracking the Code: Implementing Internet Accessibility Through the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2315, 2346 (2016).
163. Id.
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for a ‘place’ to exist.”164 People use websites like places; they talk about them
like places; and websites were designed, in some sense, to be places.165 A recent
article applying the ADA to the Internet is more concerned with administrative
costs and benefits, but nevertheless states that the nexus test is a “stop-gap
measure taken from physical corollaries that just does not effectively apply to
the Internet.”166
D. Cyberspace and Place in Legal Scholarship: Trespass and the Fourth
Amendment as Test Cases
A significant lacuna in prior scholarship arguing for or against the ADA’s
application to Internet websites is the examination of other areas of
jurisprudence to see how courts have understood the Internet generally.
Arguments over whether the Internet is a place cannot get far relying only on the
statutory language of the ADA and the small field of precedent the question has
generated. Fortunately, although courts have not held directly that the Internet
is to be treated as a place, they have generally treated it as such by implication
in their rulings on other questions. In particular, this Comment examines court
rulings on the tort of trespass and searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.
Several cases in the late 1990s and early 2000s established precedent for
treating computer networks and websites as places or the equivalent of physical
property through the common law tort of trespass. The first such class of cases
involved Internet service providers litigating over the mass sending of millions
of emails to a server. Bulk email must be sifted and eliminated by computer
networks, and that can put strain on servers, increase subscriber costs, and,
ultimately, harm the companies’ network and profit.167 In using the common
law standards for trespass to chattel, the courts asked whether (1) the defendant
intentionally caused a contact with the server; (2) whether the contact was
unauthorized; and (3) whether the contact caused damage to the server.168 In
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. the court held that a physical disposition
was only one of the ways a party could commit the tort of trespass to chattel;
other kinds of nonphysical interferences could also be trespasses.169
164. Shani Else, Courts Must Welcome The Reality of the Modern World: Cyberspace is a
Place under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1121, 1146
(2008).
165. Id. at 1146.
166. Deeva V. Shah, Web Accessibility For Impaired Users: Applying Physical Solutions To
Digital Problems, 38 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 215, 232, 234 (2016).
167. See e.g., Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (1997) (bulk
emails sent to company increased bills to subscribers, who then threatened to unsubscribe);
America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (1998) (individual head of corporation sent
over 60 million emails to AOL, generating 50,000 member complaints and costing AOL money).
168. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1020–24. See also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal.
2003) (ruling that an internet trespass did not require physical damage to the property).
169. CompuServe., 962 F.Supp. at 1022.

542

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:521

Sending mass spam email is not the only action courts had to judge when
litigating trespass issues. Another prominent issue was the use of electronic
robots or aggregators to rapidly compile information from a website, usually to
increase the competitiveness of a rival website. In eBay, Inc. v. Bitter’s Edge,
Inc.,170 the defendant was an auction aggregator who enlisted a “scraper” to
obtain auction data from eBay despite eBay’s attempts to disable robots from
using the site.171 Likewise in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio Inc.,172 the defendant
obtained information about the plaintiff’s customers through an electronic robot
and began sending mass emails soliciting their business.173 The court in eBay
ruled that the actions of Bitter’s Edge were likely sufficient to cause ongoing
harm so the court should view the action as a trespass to chattel and grant an
injunction.174
Likewise, in Register.com, because of the strain on
Register.com’s database and the intentional interference of plaintiff’s possession
by the defendant, the court found that Verio’s use of a robot constituted a
trespass to chattel.175 All of these cases indicate the courts’ general willingness
to treat interaction with and damage to nonphysical networks as analogous to
damage to and interference with actual physical property. Courts have had little
hesitation about doing so. It is arguable that, given the legislative history set out
above, interpreting a place of public accommodation along similar lines is even
more justifiable.176
Similarly, in applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet, a move such as
treating the nonphysical Internet with physical metaphors is almost inevitable
given the Fourth Amendment’s plain language. The full text of the Fourth
Amendment is as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.177
In ruling on a search-and-seizure case where the question concerned invasion
of privacy by searching of an employee’s text message, the Supreme Court
assumed for the sake of argument that “the principles applicable to a government
employer’s search of an employee’s physical office apply with at least the same
force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic
sphere.”178 In part, this assumption was based on the fact that “rapid changes in
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N. D. Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1061–62.
126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 243.
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1067–70.
Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250–52.
See supra Part I.
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
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the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not
just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”179
Recently, scholars have reviewed various court rulings on searching and seizing
data across United States borders.180 In Warshak v. United States,181 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “e-mail is an ever-increasing mode of private
communication, and protecting shared communications through this medium is
as important to Fourth Amendment principles today as protecting telephone
conversations has been in the past.”182
Space considerations preclude an exhaustive review of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as applied to evolving technology, but scholarship addressing this
question is abundant.183 Instead, this Comment draws on the insights of others
and argues that courts should use the same types of flexible standards applied to
Fourth Amendment cases when examining cases under the ADA. Orin Kerr
makes the case in Applying the Fourth Amendment: A General Approach, for a
judicial approach to the Fourth Amendment that assumes “technological
neutrality.”184 Technology neutrality “posits that judges will interpret the
Fourth Amendment in the online environment so that it has roughly the same
role in new Internet crime investigations that it has established in traditional
physical investigations.”185 Judges generally assume a neutral though cautious

179. Id. at 759.
180. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 315
(2015). In legal scholarship concerning the fourth amendment, the link between Internet locations
and physical locations is less controversial:
Internet communications regularly travel around the world. Communications can travel
almost anywhere in the course of delivery, and they can be collected anywhere they
travel. Communications from those abroad routinely travel through or to the United
States, and those in the United States routinely send Internet communications abroad
Imagine a person in Paris sends an e-mail using a service provider in California that is
destined for another suspect in New York who uses an e-mail service hosted in London.
That e-mail could be obtained in California, New York, Paris, London, or any place in
between where the communication passes, including at the U.S. border. Once collected
by the government, the data can be sent anywhere on the planet for analysis.
Id. at 316.
181. 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007).
182. Id. at 473.
183. See generally David A. Couillard, Defogging The Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment
Principles To Evolving Privacy Expectations In Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205 (2009);
Spenser S. Kady, Reconciling Privacy With Progress: Fourth Amendment Protection Of E-Mail
Stored With And Sent Through A Third-Party Internet Service Provider, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 225
(2012); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285 (2015);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of
Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011).
184. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1007 (2010).
185. Id. at 1015.
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stance towards applying the Fourth Amendment to new technology in light of
the Supreme Court’s adoption of a pragmatic approach to the question.186
In adopting a stance of technology neutrality, Kerr seeks to stick closely to
principles already established in Fourth Amendment law.187 To that end, he
advocates for the replacement of the distinction between inside and outside
physical locations with a distinction between content and non-content media in
an online context.188 He says that this distinction
[C]aptures the basic function of the inside/outside distinction. Outside
surveillance is usually surveillance relating to identity, location, and
time. By watching a person in public, the police normally can learn
where he was at a particular time and where he was going. In contrast,
inside surveillance more often exposes private thoughts. By breaking
into a person’s private spaces, the police can obtain insights into the
contents of the person’s mind that he normally keeps to himself or only
shares with a trusted few. That distinction correlates reasonably
accurately to the online distinction between content and non-content
surveillance. Online, non-content surveillance is usually surveillance
related to identity, location, and time; content surveillance is
surveillance of private thoughts and speech.189
Surveillance of non-content items would include all of the communication
tags and information about where the content originated and the parties to whom
it was transmitted.190
These assumptions—technological neutrality and the transferability of legal
distinctions from a physical to a digital realm—apply to the ADA. Like the
content/non-content distinction Kerr constructs for the Fourth Amendment, this
Comment
agrees
with
the
prior
scholarship
suggesting
a
commercial/noncommercial test.
The enumerated places of public
accommodation in Section 12182 are all linked to commerce. It is both
relatively straightforward and intuitive to examine a particular website and
determine if it offers such services. However, there should be one important
public policy caveat: “commercial” should probably not be so broad as to
include all websites that make any money. The vast majority of websites recoup
money, even if in very small amounts, from advertising revenue. Applying the
service/non-service distinction to sites inclusive of all that receive money that
way would mean that there is no site to which the ADA would not apply. Much
like how Congress was careful to delineate which public spaces must be altered
for accessibility, a prerequisite amount of care should be required for application
of the ADA to the Internet. This distinction would recognize the reality of the

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1016–17.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id. 1021.
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“internet of things”: that much of the service the average person relies upon is
not linked to any particular physical facility or location. The flagship example
is probably Uber: a cab service coordinated entirely through a mobile
application, with no centralized location. Uber would, under the service/nonservice distinction, clearly fall under the transportation section of Section
12182. The question, then, is what standard it is best to apply.
III. REGULATING PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION ON THE INTERNET:
ANTICIPATING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S NEXT STEPS
On April 29, 2016, the Department of Justice put forward its supplemental
notice of Advance Rulemaking, articulating standards it would use in judging
accessibility of federal and state government websites under Title II of the
ADA.191 Though not applicable to places of public accommodation, the overall
purposes of the new regulations could easily fit under Title III as well. The
guidelines are designed to ensure that all Internet users will have equal
unrestricted access to all governmentally-operated websites, regardless of any
disability they might have. 192
These newly proposed technical requirements are taken from the Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 standards, first published in 2008.193 The
Department of Justice’s proposed regulations apply to most web content created
by a state or local government entity. Web content is anything displayed on a
website, including the code used to construct it.194 Web content does not include
the computer or mobile device on which the website is accessed or the web
browser, such as Internet Explorer or Mozilla Firefox, that is used.195
The WCAG standards have three levels: A, AA and AAA, with level AAA
being the most stringent.196 The Department proposes using level AA of the
191. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and
Services of State and Local Government Entities, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
https://www.ada.gov/regs2016/sanprm.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2016).
192. Id. The Department of Justice plans to propose regulations for private websites sometime
in 2018, date to be determined. See New or Proposed Regulations, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
https://www.ada.gov/newproposed_regs.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).
193. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, supra note 192; Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://ww
w.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
194. WCAG Guidelines, supra note 193.
195. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, supra note 191.
196. Each individual guideline has A, AA, and AAA standards outlined in the documents. The
W3 used a factors test to determine the success criteria for each level of conformance. The factors
include whether the feature is essential, whether the criterion can be satisfied for all websites and
web content types, whether the success criteria can be reasonably achieved by the content creators,
“whether the criterion would impose limits on ‘look and feel’ “ on the web page “(limits on
function, presentation, freedom of expression, design or aesthetic that the Success Criteria might
place on authors)”, and “whether there are no workarounds if the success criterion is not met.”
Understanding WCAG 2.0 Guidelines, UNDERSTAND CONFORMANCE, https://ww
w.w3.org/TR/UNDERSTANDING-WCAG20/conformance.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
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WCAG, which includes all of the Level A requirements, are relatively
comprehensive, and are widely used internationally.197 WCAG 2.0 contains
specific technical standards for website accessibility that are more detailed than
broader performance standards, but still allow for a degree of flexibility in
implementation.198 The Department has proposed adopting a two-year time
limit with certain exceptions.199 Under the two-year time limit, all public entities
would be required to have their websites conform to WCAG 2.0 Level AA
standards within two years of publication of the new regulations. The primary
exception is if doing so within the time limit would fundamentally alter a service
or place undue financial burden on the entity. WCAG Guideline 1.2.4,
concerning live audio content, is excluded from this timeline. Instead, it may be
proposed that public entities will be required to provide captioning for all live
audio or synchronized media within three years of the publication of the
regulations. The term “synchronized media” is audio or video displayed at the
same time as other web based content that is required for understanding the
complete presentation.200
The WCAG contain detailed checklists of how website developers can make
their sites fully accessible.201 In large part, these involve actions such as
ensuring alternate access to dynamic content; providing closed captioning
wherever feasible; and allowing easy navigation with hardware other than a
keyboard and mouse. In other words, the guidelines are highly analogous to
those reasonable accommodations typically imposed on a place of public
accommodation.
In light of all of the above, the full extension of Title III of the ADA to service
websites is both reasonable and easily applicable. Assuming a technologically
neutral reading of the ADA, combined with Congress’s legislative intent,
making Internet accessibility a matter of ADA jurisprudence is no more
untenable than extending its requirements in other areas. Doing so
acknowledges society’s changing technological landscape and the increasingly
intertwined nature of physical and electronic goods and services likely to
continue. It would, however, be prudent for Congress to make this application
clear if it ever decides to amend the ADA. Doing so would be as simple as
indicating that a place of public accommodation is not limited to a discrete
physical location, but also encompasses nonphysical infrastructure that
facilitates tangible goods or services. On this view, services such as streaming

197. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, supra note 191.
198. Id. Space consideration precludes a full elaboration of the content of the WCAG. For a
detailed overview, see Zachary Parker, Defending Against the Undefined: Commercial Websites’
Violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 85 UMKC L. REV. 1079 (2017).
199. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, supra note 191.
200. Id.
201. See WCAG Checklist, WORD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://www.w3.org/TR/2
006/WD-WCAG20-20060427/appendixB.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
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television shows would count; there is little but a semantic difference from
streaming via an iPhone and playing a video via a physical DVD.
This Comment has argued that the ADA can and should be interpreted in a
technologically neutral manner. Law arises from language: to understand the
legal concept of place, it is unwise to limit examination only to court rulings.
Instead, one must dig deeper into the ways in which humans conceive of place
itself. After doing so, it becomes obvious that we speak of place in many ways
that extend beyond the physical (even if the foundational metaphors we use
involving place are rooted in physicality). Not only is an extra-physical
conception of place coherent, but courts have also used it in ruling on other
questions, including issues involving the Internet. In light of that fact, courts
should extend both the average concept of place and their rulings in other areas
of law into the realm of ADA litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Thus far, legal scholarship addressing the question of websites under the ADA
has been surprisingly narrow in its focus. The majority of these scholars spend
little time examining the concept of place more broadly to determine whether
the word itself can ever connote something extra-physical. Likewise, few
comparisons are ever made between ADA case law and other areas of relevant
jurisprudence that could provide important analogies for the ADA, such as
trespass and search-and-seizure law. The result is that courts have limited
themselves to tests such as the nexus and storefront rules, both of which fail to
consider evolving technology and the way the average person conceives of and
treats the use of the Internet. Instead of these restrictive tests—which, in light
of the broader considerations in this Comment, seem somewhat myopic—courts
should adopt a technologically neutral outlook toward Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and treat websites themselves as places of public
accommodation, rather than applying a nexus or a storefront test. The
Department of Justice should be the primary architect of regulating website
accessibility; rather than making ad-hoc decisions, future courts should rely
closely on those regulations, much as they would for other sorts of public
accommodations. Future developments in this area seem encouraging; assuming
the Department of Justice continues to carefully consider regulations beyond the
2016 SANPRM, courts may gradually adapt their legal analysis to take account
of the changing face of the Internet and its permeation of the physical and
nonphysical geography of daily life.
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